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Abstract— Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem uses 
modular multiplication for encryption and decryption. So, 
performance of RSA can be drastically improved by optimizing 
modular multiplication. This paper proposes a new parallel, 
high-radix Montgomery multiplier for 1024 bits multi-core RSA 
processor. Each computation step operates in radix 4.  The 
computation speed is increased by more than 4 times. We also 
implement a True Random Number Generator based resilience 
block to protect the coprocessor against power attacks.  
Keywords— RSA Processor; Power Analysis Attacks; 
Multicore. VLSI. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In the mid 1970’s early public key cryptosystems were 
developed to provide a solution for two parties to communicate 
in a secure manner over an insecure channel. Public key 
cryptosystems are used to establish secure communication and 
to provide non-repudiation through the use of digital 
signatures. RSA cryptosystem, named after its creators, is one 
of the most popular public key cryptosystems. The RSA 
cryptosystem has been utilized for e-commerce, various forms 
of authentication, and virtual private networks. The importance 
of high security and faster implementations paved the way for 
RSA crypto-accelerators, hardware implementations of the 
RSA algorithm. 
RSA uses Montgomery multiplication for modular 
exponentiation. The main complexity of modular 
multiplication lies in a series of lengthy operations. Several 
Montgomery multiplication methods have been proposed and 
analyzed for area and speed constraints [1], but many of them 
cannot be implemented in hardware.  The method for parallel 
k-partition Montgomery Multiplier has been proposed which 
can be implemented in hardware [3]. Using high radix digit set 
is a well-known technique to implement arithmetic algorithms 
in hardware.  Dividing the multiplier into partitions, reduces 
the number of partial products and hence reduces the number 
of clock cycles required to complete the task.  However, the 
additional complexity introduced for selecting partitions of the 
multiplier limits the computation time. Hence, a trade-off 
between area, speed, cost and energy consumptions needs to be 
achieved. 
Many public key cryptosystems base their security on the 
difficulty of solving a known hard problem such as discrete 
logarithms or integer factoring. Thus, they are assumed to be 
very secure; however, many researchers have shown that 
breaking cryptosystems is not necessarily as difficult as solving 
these known hard problems. Recently, several side channel 
attacks have been investigated which substantially reduce the 
mean time to disclosure of the secret key [2][11]. Although 
computation power has increased with Moore’s law[23][24], 
the large increase in computation costs associated public key 
cryptosystems has put a significant strain on available 
computing resources. Thus, there is a growing need for 
hardware acceleration of public key cryptosystems to reduce 
the burden of using them. Public key cryptosystems have 
become ubiquitous in computing devices. Not only have 
servers but also embedded systems have forced designers to 
add additional hardware for cryptosystems referred as crypto-
accelerators. Crypto-accelerators are very promising as they 
typically achieve better performance and better power 
efficiency than a software implementation on a generic 
processor. 
In this paper, we intend to implement and analyze a power 
attack resilient quad-core ASIC RSA processor with parallel 
high-radix Montgomery multiplication in hardware. The power 
and area consumption of the four core architecture will be 
evaluated. Power-attack resilience will be measured by 
correlating data and power. 
A. RSA algorithm  
The RSA cryptosystem is based on some mathematical 
functions which are easy to compute in one direction and 
difficult to compute in the opposite direction without special 
information. These kind of functions are called trapdoor one-
way functions. In case of RSA, the idea is that multiplication is 
relatively easier than factorization. Multiplication can be 
computed in polynomial time whereas factoring time can grow 
exponentially proportional to the size of the number. 
RSA algorithm consists of typically 3 steps - key 
generation, encryption and decryption [4]. Public key (n, e) is 
published for everyone and private key (p, q, d) must be kept 
secret. Then by using these keys encryption, decryption, digital 
signing and signature verification are performed. RSA 
algorithm modular length is commonly 1024 bit or even 2048 
bit to ensure safety. Therefore, generation of public and private 
key, encryption, decryption all rely on the high-speed of 
computer. 
The RSA algorithm requires the computation of modular 
exponentiation, which is broken into a series of modular 
multiplications [1] as shown in Algorithm 1: In 1985, 
Montgomery introduced a new method for modular 
multiplication. The Montgomery multiplication algorithm is 
used to speed up the modular multiplications and squaring 
required during the exponentiation process in RSA. The RSA 
algorithm here is the commonly used R-L Algorithm as shown 
in Algorithm 2. P is plaintext, E is the exponent, M is the 
modulus, C is the constant 22n (mod M) (which must be 
precomputed), Mont () is Montgomery multiplication and R is 
the result. 
 
B. MONTGOMERY MODULAR MULTIPLICATION 
 
The Montgomery algorithm [2][5] of two numbers, say, a 
and b computes the following: 
r=Mont(a,b) = a.b.r-1 mod M 
Where r = 2*k (k = no. of bits of M). The a and b M-
residue multiplicands are obtained from real numbers a and b 
using the following: 
A = Mont(a,r2) = a.r mod M 
B =Mont(b,r2) = b.r mod M 
Thus, the Montgomery multiplication of two M-residue 
numbers are computed as, 
R =Mont(A,B) 
R= (a.r).(b.r).r−1 mod M = a.b.r mod M 
The result is also an M-residue number and needs to be 
converted back to a real number in the following way, 
r = Mont (R, 1) = a.b.r.r−1 mod M = a.b mod M 
The Montgomery approach is very efficient as it avoids the 
time consuming trial division which is a bottleneck for most 
other algorithms. Thus, it forms the basis of many 
implementations of modular multiplication, both in software 
and hardware. The Montgomery algorithm computes the result 
by replacing the division operation of k times division by a 
power of 2 division. Thus, not only the computation time but 
also the area is reduced in hardware implementations.  Radix-2 
Montgomery Modular Multiplication can be seen in Algorithm 
3 [6]. 
 
 
Algorithm 1: RSA using Modular Exponentiation 
// Compute y = xd (mod N) 
// where, in binary, d = (d0, d1, d2, …, dn) with d0 = 1 
s = x 
for i = 1 to n 
       s = s2 (mod N) 
       if di == 1 then 
        s = s.x (mod N) 
       end if 
next i 
return s 
Algorithm 2: RSA using Montgomery Exponentiation 
RSA (P, E, M) 
{ 
e = 22n (mod N); 
P = Mont (e, P, M);      (Mapping) 
R = Mont (e, 1, M);   
for i = 0 to k – 1 do 
 if (ei == 1) then 
  R = mont (R, P, M); (Multiply) 
 end if 
 P = mont (P, P, M);     (Square) 
 end for 
 R = mont (1, R, M);  (Remapping) 
 Return R; 
} 
 
Algorithm 3: Radix - 2 Montgomery Multiplication 
Require odd M, n = 1 + [log2 M], 
X = i2i, Y = i2i, 
with 0 ≤ X, Y < M 
Ensure  ≡ XYR-1  (mod M), with 0 ≤ Z < M 
1. S[0]  0 
2.  for i  0 to n - 1 step 1 do 
3.   a  S[i] + xiY 
4.  S[i + 1]  (a + a0M)/2 
5. end for 
6. if S[n] ≥ M then 
7.  S[n]  S[n] - M 
8. end if 
9. return Z  S[n] 
 
Radix 2 means at each loop iteration in lines 2-5, one bit of 
X is multiplied with Y.  
 
Fig. 1. Radix-4 Montgomery Multiplier (MM) 
This operation is similar to multiplying with serial 
multiplication. In application with higher speed requirement, 
higher radix MM is used in which multiple bits of X is 
multiplied with Y which can be seen Fig. 1.  Consequently, the 
number of running iterations in the loop would decrease by 
using a higher radix MM which needs more area. Different 
MM with varied radixes will have different speed and area, so 
appropriate specification needs to be determined based on the 
design constraints. 
A way to speed up the Montgomery Multiplication by 
distributing the multiplier operand bits into k-partitions is 
proposed in [6]. All of them process in parallel and use an 
identical algorithm. Each partition executes its task in = n/k 
steps. Even though the computation step operates in radix, the 
complexity is reduced by the use of a limited digit set [6]. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2. The distribution of bits of into two decomposed multiplier operands 
(a)  Radix-2 (b) Radix-4 
Algorithm 4: Montgomery Multiplication Partition j (MMP) 
Require odd M, n = 1 + [log2 M], 
X = i2i, Y = i2i, 
with 0 ≤ X, Y < M, jth - partition 
0 < k, t < n, kt = n, k partitions 
Ensure ZPj ≡ MMP (j, X, Y, M) ≡ 
(XPjYR-1) mod M, with 0 ≤ ZPj < M, 
where XPj = j + ik2j+ik 
1. SPj [0]  0 
2.  for i  0 to n - 1 step 1 do 
3.   a  SPj [i] +x j+ ik 2jY 
4.  qk- 1 … 0  ak-1 ... 0 (2k - M-1 k-1 … 0) mod 2k 
5.  SPj [i + 1]  (a + qk- 1 … 0 M)/2k 
6. end for 
7. return  ZPj  SPj[n/k] 
An effective result is obtained when the manipulation of 
multiples of the multiplicand operand is performed by 
distributing the multiplier operand bits into partitions that can 
process them in parallel. The partitions of the original 
multiplier are used to express new multiplier operands that are 
used to perform Montgomery Multiplication in radix. 
Partitioning in Radix 2 and 4 can be seen in Fig. 2. The adapted 
MM for each partition can be seen in Algorithm 4 [6]. 
C. OVERVIEW OF SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS 
In cryptography, an attack based on the leaked information 
from hardware implementation is called a “side-channel 
attack” [2]. Active attacks, also referred as tampering attacks, 
require access to the internal circuitry of the attacked device 
[8]. In passive attacks, key dependent variation of 
cryptographic processor is monitored to retrieve the private 
key.  There are mainly four  types according to the type of the 
leaked information: Power Analysis [11], Electromagnetic 
Analysis [9][10], Acoustic Analysis [12] and Timing 
attacks[13]. All passive attacks can be either simple or 
differential. Power Analysis (PA) attacks are based on 
analyzing the power consumption of the cryptographic device 
while it performs encryption or decryption [11]. The physical 
supporting point of these attacks is that today CMOS 
technology is the one to be used most commonly for digital 
integrated circuit implementations and the dissipated power in 
these circuits is dependent on the transitions and activity of the 
circuit which is also dependent on the data that is processed.    
II. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
As discussed in the previous section, radix 2 or higher can 
be utilized in implementing k-partition algorithm. Basically, 
the k-partition method is used to divide the Montgomery 
multiplication to multiple partial multiplications that are 
performed in parallel in different cores. But the radix, which is 
the width of operations in each core influences the architecture, 
area and speed of each core and consequently this has to be 
designed carefully. Primarily, radix is the number of bits of X 
that are multiplied by Y in each iteration and determines the 
size of intermediate values and multipliers.  
On the other hand, as Y is constant in all iterations and all 
cores, it is possible to pre-compute the results of 
multiplications in the beginning of the process and just use the 
final results to reduce the critical path and computation time. 
For example, by choosing radix 8, it is necessary to compute 
the product of Y with 011, 101, 111 and all others can be 
generated by shifting Y or the mentioned products.  So the first 
decision for choosing the radix value was 24 which seemed 
reasonable in terms of speed and area. But after the 
implementation and APR, the area for this design turned out to 
be much larger than expected. So the radix was reduced to 22. 
By this change, the number of iterations to compute the 
Montgomery product will increase from 64 in radix 24 to 128 
iteration in radix 22. In the same frequency, the higher radix 
would be almost two time faster than the low radix one. 
However, the width of multipliers and adders in the data path 
of 22 design would be half of the 24 one and consequently the 
critical path is much less. It is, thus, possible to increase the 
frequency for 128 cycles of computation. So the penalty in 
throughput would not be much although we are considerably 
reducing the area. 
A. TOP level: RSA Processor 
 
Fig 3. Top Level Architecture for RSA processor 
1024-bit RSA processor is implemented using 4 identical 
independent cores, each computing the partial product without 
any inter-core data dependencies. Each 1024-bit message is 
divided into four partial segments of same size, each going to a 
core for computation. Using a higher radix (radix 4) 
multiplication further speeds this up. Hence, the computation 
speed is increased as each partition computes the partial 
product in 1024/8 iterations. The partial products are added 
appropriately to give the final modular product. The top level 
has four cores for partial product computations and an adder as 
shown in the Fig. 3.  
 
Fig 4. Top Architecture 
 
Fig 5. Finite State Machine depicting top module 
Algorithm 5. (RSA using Montgomery Exponentiation 
RSA (P, E, M) 
{ 
e = 22n (mod M); 
P = Mont (e, P, M);   MONT 1 
R = Mont (e, 1, M);   MONT 2 
for i = 0 to k – 1 do 
 if (ei == 1) then 
            R = mont (R, P, M);  MONT 3 
 end if 
 P = mont (P, P, M);   MONT 4  
 end for 
 R = mont (1, R, M);   MONT 5 
 Return R; 
}  
 
1) Architecture: 
Fig. 4 shows the datapath for the top module. The values of 
key, M, Mprime, e, plain_text and cipher_text are pin muxed as 
a data [31:0] inout pin and are stored in their respective 
register through the given bus. Moreover, the required input for 
the Montgomery operation is provided through the registers 
X_reg, Y_reg, M and Mprime. The output of the Montgomery 
block, M_out is ready to sent back to P or R registers for 
further computation or is stored in cipher_text register to be 
sent out through the data pin. 
2) Control and timing: 
 Once the SYS_RESET is deasserted, sel can be 01, 10  and 
11 for loading the key, loading the data and starting 
Montgomery respectively. 
a) Loading the key: 
 When sel is 01, the state machine goes to LOAD_KEY 
state, and remains in that state for 96 cycles till the key, M, 
Mprime and e are loaded serially into their respective registers. 
b) Loading the data:  
When sel is 10, the state machine goes to LOAD_DATA state 
for 32 cycles to store the serial 32-bit data into plaintext 
register. The state returns to IDLE after each of these states 
making them independent and re-executable. 
c) Start Montgomery:  
Once the key and data are loaded, and sel becomes 11, the 
state machine goes through the various steps of RSA algorithm 
shown in Algorithm 5 through the states MONT1 to MONT5 as 
depicted in the Fig. 7 once the RSA output is computed after 
2051 Montgomery operations, the FSM goes to state DONE, 
resets the Montgomery block and asserts the ready output in 
top to indicate that the output is ready. This 1024-bit ciphertext 
is available as output through the pin-muxed 32-bit inout data 
pin serially in 32 consecutive clock cycles. 
B. Montgomery Module 
 
Fig 6. Mont module architecture 
1) Architecture: 
The data from the X_reg and Y_reg from top inputs into the 
Mont block. Multiplier X is stored in register Xm from where it 
enters the 4 cores of the Mont block by shifting 8 bits at a time 
which can be seen in Fig. 6. The multiplicand Y and Y*3  also 
goes as input to the 4 cores. If the partial products of the core 
are greater than M, they are subtracted from M. These 4 partial 
products are then added together in a 1024-bit adder, and 
subsequently M is subtracted  from the sum to obtain correct 
value for modM. This 1024-bit M_out is sent to the top as the 
Montgomery output.  
2) Control and Timing: 
The top asserts the start_mont signal to indicate the 
Montgomery to start. The Montgomery asserts the start_core 
signal to indicate the cores to start processing. State INIT 
moves to state WORK. Xm[1:0], Xm[3:2], Xm[5:4] and 
Xm[7:6] are connected to core 0 , 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Xm 
is continuously shifted by 8 bits in each clock cycle to provide 
all the values to the core for computation. The Mont FSM stays 
in state WORK for 128 clock cycles which are tracked using a 
counter to complete the computation of the partial product. The 
partial product is sent out and done signal is asserted.  
C. CORE 
 
Fig 7. Core module architecture 
Fig 8. Timing diagram for core module 
1) Architecture 
2-bit Xj from the Mont block is input to the core along with 
Y and Y*3. To minimize the computation and time, 
Xj[1:0]*Y[1023:0] has been implemented using the signals 
Y00, Y01, Y10, Y11 as mux input. This value is added to the 
value of Sn computed in the previous cycle. As shown in Fig. 
7, the lower 8 bits of Sn1 which is the output of the previous 
addition is multiplied to Mprime to generate Qi which is 
further multiplied with M. This output is added to Sn1, stored 
in a register and shifted by 8 bits for the next 
computation.  After processing the entire segment in one 
partition for 128 cycles, the partial product of the Montgomery 
is passed to Montgomery module for summation.  
2) Control and Timing 
After receiving start_core, the core starts computation of 
the partial product by entering the WORK state from INIT state 
for 128 cycles. Once the output is computed, the FSM goes to 
DONE state, the done signal would be asserted and Sn_out is 
given as output of the core shown in Fig. 8.  
III. OVERCOMING POWER ATTACKS 
The key of the RSA can be traced through Power Analysis 
and thus it is important to mask the power in the way that it 
does not reveal the key information.  
A. Algorithmic level 
The RSA operational dependency on the key is eliminated 
at an algorithmic level by performing modular multiplication 
independent of the key value. However, the data dependent 
power variation still remains and is corrected using other 
techniques.  
B. Inherent Power resilience: 
Montgomery multiplication is being carried for 2 bits in 
each core at each iteration. There are 4 such independent cores 
being executed at the same time. So, there are 8 bits being 
executed in a single clock cycle.  So that makes it 128 times 
more difficult to identify the secret key compared to a single 
bit Montgomery with one core. Although the required 
complexity of power attack is increased, it is still susceptible to 
power attacks.  Several Power resilience techniques under 
consideration for this project are described in the next section. 
C. Custom power resilient techniques: 
1) Switched Capacitor Technique: 
First, Switched capacitance method as described in [7] was 
considered. In this technique, as shown in Fig. 9, a switched 
capacitor block isolates the core from the power supply and 
avoids any variable switching activity directly from the power 
supply. This is implemented using 3 arrays of capacitors which 
are switched between three phases: 
1- Charged from the power supply 
2- Provide charge to the encryption core 
3- Discharged to a known value 
 
Each capacitor is charged from the power supply and is 
then isolated while it provides charge to the sensitive blocks of 
the encryption core. The capacitor is discharged to a known 
value before it is recharged. This ensures that the current drawn 
remains constant and provide resilience.  Large capacitors are 
needed in order to provide supply to the encryption core 
resulting in a huge area penalty. Also,  the voltage of the 
capacitor providing power to the core is going to drop resulting 
in a performance penalty.   
2) Op-amp based Current Equalizer: 
In order to overcome the area penalty, an op-amp based 
current equalizer method was considered. An op-amp circuit 
can be used to dynamically bias an NMOS connected in path 
parallel to the core to make up for any mismatch in current of 
the core. This ensures always the same current being drawn 
from the power supply. Essentially core supply is maintained at 
constant voltage. The setup is shown in Fig. 10. Because of 
finite response time of op-amp to overcome the current 
variation by core, attackers can use this this timeframe to 
retrieve the secret key. So, the core is still susceptible to power 
attacks. 
3) Constant Current Source Operation 
Constant current based operation was also proposed. As 
shown in Fig. 11, first the core supply capacitance is charged to 
appropriate voltage and the current drawn by the core is copied 
and supplied back to the core to maintain constant core supply 
voltage. The extra current from the current source is dissipated 
by the resistor. This technique has very low area overhead and 
is able to reach very high level of power attack resiliency. But 
performance is severely  degraded because of core supply will 
be at lower voltage than VDD.  
 
Fig 9. Switched Capacitor Technique [7] 
 
Fig 10. Current equalizer for power-attack resilience 
 
 
Fig 11. Constant current source circuit 
4) Proposed resilience method 
In order to overcome all limitations as mentioned above, 
we propose a True Random Number Based Power Resilience 
technique. Conventionally, Randomly generated numbers are 
used to turn on/off oscillators to generate random power 
variation. This random power variation breaks any correlation 
between any power model and power measurements of the 
coprocessor. Jitter Amplifier based random number generation 
is described in [14]. Jitter amplifier increases the uncertainty of 
the random numbers and allows us to sample it at much higher 
frequency. As it is true random number generator, bit stream 
generated after each system reset is different. Random bit 
stream generated by Jitter Amplifier in [15] passes all 15 tests 
in NIST P800-22 with 99% confidence. The complete setup is 
as shown in Fig. 12. Jitter amplifier uses dynamically varying 
delay cells to increase uncertainty and amount of Jitter 
variation for the system clock Now, this clock is used as a 
sampling clock to generate a random number bit stream . Now 
the delay cells in Jitter Amplifier  have random power 
variation. In order to reduce area overhead, these delay cells 
itself can be used as a source of random power. As this power 
gets added to the core power, the resultant power waveform is 
also completely random for drawing random power from the 
power supply.  This proposed technique reduced area penalty 
compared to conventional method as the circuit module is 
shared for both generating random number and create random 
power variations.  As the critical path of the core is not 
affected, there is no performance penalty for this method. 
IV. RESULTS AND SIMULATIONS 
The MATLAB Simulations for parallel Radix-2, Radix-4 
and Radix-16 were performed. The golden bricks for the core 
and top level are created and expected results are achieved for 
different radixes. Based on the first decision for radix in this 
project, the RTL for the radix-16 architecture of core block, 
Montgomery Multiplier and Top level RSA Processor was 
coded and debugged. The core was synthesized with no slacks 
or violations and post synthesize verification was also done 
which resulted in the correct expected output. However, after 
the implementation, the area for this design turned out to be 
much larger than expected.  
So the radix was reduced to 22 and once more all the steps 
containing RTL coding, synthesize, and APR were done and 
each step was verified by comparing with the respective golden 
brick.  The synthesis reports’ summary of two implemented 
design are mentioned in Table I.  
The simulations for the switched capacitor current equalizer 
are performed and the correct switching between capacitor 
modules is obtained. The two methods mentioned for power 
attack resilience will be simulated against the core and 
considered against performance, area and power tradeoffs. 
Fig. 13 shows a random bit stream generated for several 
clock cycles. Red waveform is random bit stream and pink 
waveform is the system clock. Fig. 13 shows how the Jitter of 
the system clock is increased after Jitter Amplifier. Fig. 14(a) 
shows the frequency of variation of the system clock given as 
input to Jitter Amplifier.  
Fig. 14(b) shows the frequency variation of the clock given 
as output of the jitter amplifier. It can be seen that range of 
frequency variation is increased from 548 MHz-553 MHz to 
500 MHz-625 MHz. The red waveform is the clock and the 
blue waveform is the frequency for each clock cycle.  
TABLE I.  SPECIFICATIONS OF CORE IN RADIX 22 AND 24 DESIGN 
Radix F 
(MHz) 
Area 
(mm2 ) 
Synthesis  
Area 
(mm2 ) 
APR 
No. 
of 
Cells 
RSA 
Duration 
(ms) 
Power 
(uW) 
22 277 9.9 2.5*2 8.6K 0.945 
 
360 
24 166 16.1 - 123
K 
0.812 357 
  
 
 
 
Fig 12. Proposed jitter based noise generator circuit 
 
 
Fig 13. Random bit stream generator over different clock cycles 
 
Fig. 14(a). Input Clock of Jitter Amplifier showing frequency 
variation         
 
Fig. 14(b). Output Clock of Jitter Amplifier showing incresed frequency 
variatiion 
 
Fig. 15 Layout of resilience block 
Layout of the custom block is as shown in Fig. 15. The 
resilience block area is 3987 um2 which is only 0.02 % of the 
total area. Fig 19 shows the average power of the this block 
for a time period one RSA instruction after 10 system resets.  
 Fig. 16 Average power after different systm reset 
 
Fig. 17 Two different power traces for same duration 
 It can be seen that the average power is not constant 
showing the true randomness of the reseilience block. Fig. 16 
shows two different power traces for the same time frame. It 
can be easily seen that the spike variation for both the run are 
different.  
 After integrating the design with the resiliency block, 
the efficiency of the proposed against power analysis attack 
needs to be verified. By referring to publication in this regard, 
it can be seen there is no specific metric in this purpose unless 
the number of required traces to measure show the 
unfeasibility of attack by increasing the number of traces to 
attack the resilient design and compare it to the non-resilient 
block. To obtain a single trace, we need to run post APR 
simulation and obtain the power trace by running the power 
simulation using Power Prime. As the run time for one trace of 
one run encryption is long and our design is very complex 
obtaining a single trace would take a considerable time. So 
using the conventional method to verify the resiliency by 
obtaining exhaustive number of traces is not feasible.  
  
 So here, we propose a new method to verify the design, 
which is based on Correlation Power Attack.  CPA has been 
called the most efficient power analysis attack as it uses 
correlation coefficient to show the maximum correlation 
between power model of the processed data and power traces. 
So by implementing CPA on protected and un-protected 
design and comparing the result, it is possible to measure and 
verify the design.  
  
 For this purpose, 100 power traces of protected and un-
protected design was obtained using the mentioned procedure 
in Power Prime and converted to usable data in Matlab. After 
implementing CPA in Matlab, the attack was successfully 
implemented on two sets the traces. The result of attacks can 
be seen in Fig 18.  
 Comparing the result of two traces shows that the 
correlation coefficient of the protected design is decreased 
from 0.97 to 0.37. Although the area overhead the protection 
block is less than 0.001 of actual design, the level of 
resiliency, which it had provided is considerable that proves 
the effectiveness of the proposed idea.  By changing the area 
of resiliency block, the level of protection can be modified 
too. This will result in power and area penalty, which is the 
case in all protection methods that has a trade-off between 
protection level and throughput, frequency, area and power. 
The final floorplan is shown in Fig. 19.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 18. Correlation Coefficient, (a) protected block, (b) non-protected block 
 
 
Fig. 19. Full-chip floorplan 
TABLE II.  COMPARSION WITH PREVIOUS RSA DESIGNS 
Year Technology Area Power Throughput Frequency Duration of RSA 
2011 [16] 90nm 861 gates  -  - 432MHz 118.7ms 
2011 [17] 180nm 107k gates  - 578kbps 450MHz 1.79ms 
2011 [18] -  -  -  - -   - 
2013 [19] 40nm 804k tansistors 350mW  - 923MHz 3.1mS 
2013 [20] 65nm 820kgates 
(1.925*3 um
2
) 
400mW  - 920MHz 0.13ms 
2013 [21] 180nm 107k gates 
 (2.73 mm
2
) 
798mW 121kbps 125MHz 8.44m 
2013 [22] 180nm 714676 um
2
 40.3mW 433.04kbps -   - 
OURS 130nm 20.25 mm
2
  139 mW 1250kbps 222MHz 0.8 ms 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The1024-bit RSA processor is fast and secure. Even 
though, the core of the RSA runs at 3.6ns, the processor clock 
periods is 4.5 ns due to the core library setup time. 
Consequently, the frequency is 222 MHz. The parallel core 
and high radix Montgomery multiplication reduces the total 
number of clock cycles required, thereby reducing the RSA 
computational time to 1.2 ms. Implemented in IBM 130 nm 
technology, the processor (excluding the IO pads) is 
20.2 sq.mm in area and the power consumption is about 139 
mW. The power resilience block adds very less area overhead 
of 0.02% and improves the resiliency by reducing the 
correlation coefficient from 0.9 to 0.4. In conclusion, the high 
radix k-partition implementation of Montgomery 
multiplication reduces the number of computation cycles 
considerably. Pipelining and interleaving the single core 
Montgomery multiplication would provide fast computation in 
lesser area. This approach could be explored further. The 
Random Number Generator used for power resiliency can be 
up-sized and is reusable across crypto-processors. 
VI. TEAM ORGANIZATION 
At some point of time one or the other team member did 
each type of work. So everyone rotated the work among 
themselves and worked on all topics in all phases.  
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